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An empirical investigation of hybrid corporate governance systems in large 
firms: Evidence from India 
 
IFSAM TRACK:  G4 – Governance 
 
Abstract  
The heightened pace of corporate governance reforms has focussed attention on country-
specific governance models. In relation to India, scholars have observed that a hybrid of the 
outsider Anglo-Saxon system and the insider Continental system is likely. This paper reports 
the results of a study that investigated the corporate governance system of five large firms in 
2008. It presents evidence based on publicly available documents and twelve key executive 
interviews. The paper initially presents a literature review and establishes six propositions 
based on the distinguishing features of the two major systems, and then presents the 
methodology, findings and discussion. The governance characteristics of the Indian firms are 
classified in terms of the two systems with a view to assessing the extent and nature of 
hybridization. The findings endorse the hybrid corporate governance system in India. 
However, the scope of this study was limited to large listed companies and business groups. 
Future research should use a larger and more diverse sample including private and unaffiliated 
firms for outcomes that can be generalized.  
 
 
 
Keywords:  Corporate governance, Hybridization, Large firms, India 
 
 
Introduction 
The heightened pace of corporate governance reforms in developing countries has focussed 
attention on country-specific governance models, with practitioners and scholars attempting to 
understand the similarities and differences of the models. One clear indication from the 
country studies is that a mixed system of governance can emerge in developing countries 
(Afsharipour, 2009). For instance, Sarkar and Sarkar (2000: 168) observed that ‘based on 
some broad comparisons with the two main prototype governance systems in the world, the 
Indian corporate governance system is by and large a hybrid of the `outsider systems' of the 
US and UK, and the `insider systems' of continental Europe and Japan’. Similarly, Dwivedi 
and Jain (2005) and Gollakota and Gupta (2006) have also found evidence of a home-grown 
system in India. At first glance, this hybridization may appear to be merely an outcome of 
globalization (Yoshikawa & Rasheed, 2009). However, a literature review of the Indian 
governance system reveals that its hybrid corporate governance system ‘has been in existence 
for a considerable period of time’ (Kar, 2001: 249).  
 
An empirical study of governance issues in India, in particular, is thought to be important due 
to the possibility of India having a number of unique governance issues (Jackling & Johl, 
2009). Not only in terms of governance practice, but also with regard to theory development, 
India and other developing countries offer tremendous opportunities (Judge, 2009), making 
this study timely and relevant.  Furthermore, Allen et al. (2007: 22), based on their sample of 
2753 Indian non-financial firms, reported that controlling interests in about 78% of the Indian 
firms reside with a particular individual or family. However, pyramiding, cross-holdings and 
non-public trusts mean that their governance structures are complex and opaque (Jackling & 
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Johl, 2009). Hence, an analysis of India’s home–grown, stylized governance system will 
provide information for countries such as China and Germany and the South Asian region that 
have a large proportion of family-owned businesses. For these countries, the development of a 
‘home-grown’ governance system is a necessity, not a choice, if good governance is to take 
root (Jaffer & Sohail, 2007). With globalization, not only do Indian firms need to have an 
increased understanding of their own practices, but foreign multinationals doing business in 
India need to be aware of the Indian governance system (Li & Nair, 2009). 
 
This paper attempts to provide empirical evidence on the corporate governance systems in 
large businesses in India by exploring two types of data: one, the publicly available data from 
the Indian stock exchanges and the company’s annual reports, and two, the interview data 
from twelve key informants from five established Indian businesses. The first section of the 
paper presents the theoretical underpinnings of the Anglo-Saxon and the Continental systems, 
and frames a series of propositions on the distinguishing features of the two major systems. 
The methodology, findings and discussion are then presented. The specific characteristics of 
the corporate governance systems in the Indian businesses are explored and an attempt is 
made to classify the characteristics in terms of the Anglo-Saxon and Continental systems with 
a view to assessing the extent and nature of hybridization. The verification of the propositions 
follows. The limitations of the study and future research needs are also presented. 
 
Theoretical underpinnings of the Anglo-Saxon and Continental systems 
Several scholars have articulated the key aspects of the main global corporate governance 
systems. While one approach has been to scrutinize the systems at the level of countries, the 
other approach examines the systems at the level of firms. For instance, Weimer and Pape’s 
(1999) taxonomy was based on corporate governance systems at the level of countries. The 
authors delineated two market-oriented systems – the Anglo-Saxon and Germanic, and two 
network-oriented systems - Latin and Japanese, based on a set of discernible and easily 
obtained data. The variables used were: the prevailing concept of the firm in terms of whether 
it was oriented to independent shareholders who exercise control on the firm through the 
external stock market, or whether several groups of oligarchic stakeholders influence 
decision-making in the firm; whether the board had a single tier with both executive and 
supervisory responsibilities or whether this was split in two; whether the shares were widely 
held or concentrated in the hands of a few; whether the stock market importance was high or 
low based on two indicators used by the World Federation of Exchanges; whether the external 
market was active; the extent to which executive compensation was dependent on corporate 
performance; and the time horizon of economic relationships. Accordingly, Anglo-Saxon 
systems were shareholder-oriented, exhibited single-tier boards, accorded high importance to 
the economy’s stock market and hence had an active external market and focused on short-
term relationships. In contrast, a Continental system with its cross-shareholdings and inter-
locking directorships exhibited long-term relationships, a stakeholder orientation, relatively 
less-widely held shares and accorded a low importance to the stock market.  
 
In 2001, Nestor and Thompson distinguished the ‘outsider’ system, or market-based system, 
from the Continental system or ‘insider’ system. Accordingly, the ‘outsider’ system is 
characterised by a legal and regulatory approach based on the assumption that the dispersed 
body of investors who own the company need to be protected. Thus, this system ‘presumes 
ample disclosure of information, strict trading rules and liquid stock markets’ (p. 23). In 
contrast, in the ‘insider’ system, ownership and control is relatively more closely held. Thus, 
the dispersal of ownership is low with fewer agency problems in comparison to the ‘outsider’ 
system.   
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Garrett (2004: 2) distinguished the governance systems as falling along a “rules-based” versus 
“principle-based" continuum as follows:  
A simple explanation of the difference between the two approaches is illustrated by 
the different concepts conveyed by the terms "law" and "guideline". The result is a 
different mindset with respect to corporate governance in the United States, which 
applies a rule- or law-based approach, where what is not prohibited is permitted, 
compared to a principles-based approach where greater discretion is vested in a 
company's management to make decisions regarding governance activities. A 
principles-based approach to governance is one in which guidelines are clear, but 
compliance with them is voluntary. 
Thus, the rules-based system is more common in countries that adopt the Anglo-Saxon 
system, while companies relying on principles are more often regarded as operating within the 
Continental system.  
 
Of those who investigated the firm-level governance systems, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 
found that firms in the USA and the UK rely substantially on an extensive system of rules to 
protect investors, including minority rights, which allows for easy transfer of shares, with 
power to shareholders for class-action suits or to sue directors for violations of fiduciary duty. 
Eighty percent of large US publicly traded firms’ shares are widely held, that is, defined as 
having ‘no single shareholder in control of 20% of the voting rights’, with the remaining 20% 
controlled by families, and none of the firms controlled by another widely held corporation 
(Ryan, 2005). Moreover, the influence of trade unions is much less when compared with the 
Continental model. In contrast, firms in Europe and Japan have less reliance on elaborate 
legal protections and more reliance on large investors and banks (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997).  
 
Cernat (2004) introduced the terms ‘capital-related’ aspects and ‘labour-related’ aspects to 
differentiate the systems, and argued that the Continental model led to a more secure 
economic environment that allows firms to seek higher profits in the long-term as banks were 
represented on the Board of Directors, as opposed to the short-term view imposed by the 
stock markets on Anglo-Saxon companies. Furthermore, he reported that ‘free float is limited 
and dividends less prioritized than in the Anglo-Saxon system’ which meant that the 
shareholders did not face the classic Hirshmanian choice of ‘voice or exit’. Accordingly, less 
fluid stock markets make exit more costly, and, therefore, shareholders have a strong 
incentive to gain a powerful ‘voice’ in the management of the firm (Cernat, 2004: 154). 
Morck and Steier (2005) called this domination by the banks ‘bank capitalism’, and observed 
that errant managers could be forced back into order by the banks that would withhold credit 
and starve the misgoverned firm of capital. However, the authors cautioned that bank 
capitalism, or the Continental system, would allocate capital efficiently only if the bankers 
were altruistic and competent, and would create significant problems for the firms if the banks 
are themselves misgoverned.  
 
Propositions used for this paper 
Based on the distinguishing features of the Anglo-Saxon system and the Continental system, a 
series of propositions were framed. In addition, a decision criterion based on the literature was 
established to aid the classification of the Indian firms.  
 
Proposition 1:  Strength of the Legal System: 
The Anglo-Saxon governance system seeks to protect shareholders through a multitude of 
laws and regulations. The decision criterion for this proposition is ‘evidence of mandatory 
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legal rules, regulations and codes for the governance of companies’ and ‘evidence of degree 
of enforcement’. India’s tradition of ‘English common law and a democratic political system’ 
(Li & Nair, 2009) means that one would expect Indian corporate governance to adhere more 
closely to the Anglo-Saxon system.  
 
Proposition 2:  Concept of the Firm: 
In a Continental system, one specific shareholder or a large shareholder can often be 
identified who exerts a substantial influence on managerial decision-making. It is usually 
either a domestic or foreign promoter. The decision criterion is the presence of one significant 
shareholder, with ‘significant’ defined as ‘ownership interests greater than 20%’. This cut-off 
point is well acknowledged by La Porta et al. (1999: 57), and other researchers (see Ryan, 
2005). In contrast, the absence of one specific large shareholder would indicate that the 
governance system is Anglo-Saxon. Thus, the Anglo-Saxon system accords a high level of 
power for the managers, while the Continental system accords that power to the controlling 
group of shareholders. India, with its large proportion of family-based firms and high 
promoter holdings, means that one would expect Indian corporate governance to adhere more 
closely to the Continental system. 
 
 
Proposition 3:  Importance of the Stock Market to the Economy: 
Economies that accord a high importance to the stock market adhere to the Anglo-Saxon 
system (Weimer & Pape, 1999). The authors cite Franks and Mayer (1990: 209) who 
observed, in their study of capital markets, regulation and corporate ownership, that the 
prominent role of the stock market is an outcome of the focus on rules and regulations in an 
Anglo-Saxon system, which does so on the principle of ‘equal access to information and 
protection of small investors from exploitation by dominant shareholders’. The decision 
criterion for gauging the importance of the stock market is the Market Capitalization of 
Domestic Companies (MCDC) as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP).  India, 
with its tradition of rules, as discussed earlier, is expected to accord high importance to the 
stock market. 
  
Proposition 4:  Role and Control by Banks: 
The Anglo-Saxon system exhibits a low level of control by banks on the Boards of firms. The 
percentage of equity ownership by banks provided in the ‘shareholding pattern’ data provides 
an assessment of the extent of control. In the Continental system, the level of ownership is 
higher in comparison to the Anglo-Saxon system. Ghosh’s (2007) study on the extent of bank 
debt in Indian firms revealed that large firms had negligible bank debt and, hence, fewer or no 
nominees on the Board. Thus, for the purposes of this study which uses large firms, one 
would expect the role of banks to be low. 
 
Proposition 5:  Structure of the Board of Directors: 
Anglo-Saxon systems generally have a single-tier board, composed of Executive (inside) and 
non-Executive (outside) members, with both categories of members appointed and dismissed 
by shareholders. The median number of directors is 12 (see Hanson & Song, 2000: 62), in 
comparison to the Continental system where there are fewer directors. Anglo boards are also 
comprised of more independent directors compared to continental systems of governance.  
The decision criterion is ‘the number of members on the Board’, ‘number of tiers visible in 
the Board’, and the ‘number of independent directors’, as presented in the Annual Reports. In 
India, the traditional board structure has been single-tier with Securities Exchange Board of 
India (SEBI) proposing a two-tier structure for the Public Sector Undertakings (PSU’s) only 
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in June 2005 (see Subramanyan, 2005). This was confirmed by the World Bank’s Corporate 
Governance Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes (CG ROSC) Country 
Assessment of India in 2004, which observed that Indian firms have a ‘unitary board 
structure’ (p. 12). Therefore, it is expected that Indian firms would exhibit a single-tier 
structure, with a higher number of independent directors.  
 
Proposition 6:  Extent of Free Float: 
Anglo-Saxon markets are characterized as being very liquid, whereas the Continental system 
results in less liquidity. As Berghe (2002) observed, the first reason for the low liquidity of 
the insider systems is the concentrated ownership and the resultant low free float, while the 
second reason relates to the longer-term perspective of the average shareholders. In 
comparison, liquidity in the US markets is higher, due to the relatively short-term investment 
horizon, and the significant role of the day traders. The decision criterion for ‘high’ free float 
is a ‘free float factor greater than 55%’. This usage of a cut-off point in the range of 50% - 
60% is in line with other scholars (see Chong & Lopez-de-Silanes, 2007: 233; Kaserer & 
Wagner, 2004: 14). The free float factor for the Indian listed companies is reported by the 
Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) Mumbai. BSE defines free float as ‘the proportion of total 
shares issued by the company which are readily available for trading in the market. It 
generally excludes promoters’ holdings, government holdings, strategic holdings and other 
locked-in shares, which will not come into the market for trading in the normal course’ (BSE, 
2009). It is a standardized calculation and updated data is available in the Business Standard 
publication. As Biswal (n.d.a.) notes, ‘the available free-float in most American companies is 
above 90 percent whereas, in India, promoters have more than a 50 percent stake in the 
majority of the large companies’, which means that one would expect the Indian firms to 
exhibit less free float than in the USA. 
 
Method 
 
In this paper, the publicly available data is quantitative in nature, for instance, the GDP 
figures of the country, the value of the stock exchange, or the stock ownership data. The 
numerical data is used to investigate the propositions. The qualitative interview data is used to 
uncover in-depth understanding about the governance systems and provide greater insight 
than what simple numerical figures provide.  To achieve this, the qualitative data uses 
interpretative measures. Interpretivism ‘stresses the subjective aspects of human activity by 
focusing on the meaning rather than measurement of social phenomena’ (Hussey & Hussey, 
1997:53). It claims that social phenomena are not open to direct observation as per the 
positivists, but are only accessible via the interpretations of individuals and groups, with those 
involved thus assigning meaning, significance or value (Porter, 1998:14-5). The interpretive 
paradigm is more appropriate in situations where the researcher is attempting to study real-life 
experiences by participation in order to better understand and express its values, details and 
features (Healy & Perry, 2000:119). It is the preferred paradigm when dealing with complex 
social phenomena involving reflective people who make choices in the real world, with the 
choices themselves being contingent upon the environment (Healy & Perry, 2000:120). 
Hence, interpretation examines the way people think and act, and assumes that bias is 
removed by accurately describing the meanings and interpretations of participants.  
 
Sample and Variables  
The sampling method used purposive sampling to locate well-established firms listed on both 
the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) and the National Stock Exchange (NSE) in India, which 
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allows us to trace the evolution of their corporate governance practices over time. This 
selection of established firms is in line with other studies (see Khanna & Palepu, 2000). The 
selection of interviewees was based on expert sampling and ensured that more than one key 
informant was available from each firm to provide multiple perspectives of the firm. 
Executives working in the area of Corporate Governance, and/or Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) and/or as Corporate Secretaries were contacted through email and an 
appointment sought in their office. Accordingly, with the exception of one firm which had 
only one interviewee due to lack of availability, the other four firms had two or more. 
 
Two types of data were used in the study. The publicly available data from the Indian stock 
exchanges and the company’s annual reports were used alongside the interview data from 
twelve key informants from five established Indian businesses operating in the oil, steel, 
aluminium and textile machinery industries. The face-to-face interviews, which lasted close to 
two hours each, were conducted over three weeks in July 2008 in the companies’ offices in 
India. The interviews were digitally recorded and transcribed and the typed transcripts were 
sent to the interviewees for verification. The study adhered to the National Health and 
Medical Research Council (NHRMC) Ethics guidelines. Interview data were analyzed and 
classified into two major themes, namely, evidence from traditional governance systems and 
practices as to whether they were Anglo-Saxon or Continental, and evidence on a voluntary 
approach to principle-centred governance rather than as a response to laws and regulations.  
 
 
A brief background of each of the five firms is provided below. 
Oilco Oilco is a large Public Sector Undertaking (PSU) engaged in the oil industry. Based in 
North India, its annual turnover in the most recent fiscal year was US$25,000 million. It 
began operations in the 1950s, and since then has entered into mergers with four 
organisations. A review of the firm’s annual reports and the key informant interviews with the 
Board members and employees demonstrate that its corporate governance has evolved since 
the time of its establishment in the early 1990s. Three key executives were interviewed in this 
company. 
 
Steelco 1 Steelco 1 is one of the oldest integrated steel companies in India and manufactures 
and markets steel, steel building and construction applications. It was established in the early 
1900s in India, and today its operations span the globe. Its corporate governance system was 
firmly established by its founders and was formalized in the 1990s when the corporate 
governance agenda was discussed in the public forum. Steelco 1 is part of a large, diversified, 
family-based group consisting of 13 listed companies. Based in North India, the global 
conglomerate derives 61% of its revenues from international operations and is reported to 
have US$62.79 billion in total revenues.  Its total market cap was US$41.7 billion in June 
2009. Three key executives were interviewed in this company. 
 
Steelco 2 Like Steelco 1, Steelco 2 is also part of a large, diversified, family-based group with 
interests in manufacturing and marketing steel, energy and infrastructure and logistics. The 
business group was established in 1982, and incorporated its steel business in South India in 
1992. Steelco 2 reported annual revenue of INR.1706430 lakhs (approximately US$ 3.6 
billion at current exchange rates of US$1 = 47.68 INR) in the most recent financial year. The 
Group is a US$10 billion conglomerate with 12 steel plants in India and 2 steel plants in the 
USA. Three key executives were interviewed in this company. 
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Aluminiumco Similar to Steelco1 and Steelco2, Aluminiumco is part of a diversified, non-
ferrous metals and mining group established in 1979, The Group is listed on the London 
Stock Exchange and has reported revenues in excess of US$6.6 billion for the year ending 31 
March 2009. Aluminiumco is based in South India and was established in 1995. It reported 
gross revenue of Rs5083.35 million (approximately US$106 million) in the most recent 
financial year. Two key executives were interviewed in this company. 
 
Textilemachineryco Textilemachineryco was founded in 1962 and designs, develops and 
exports a range of textile machinery. This company is the smallest in the sample used for this 
study. Based in South India, it reported revenues of Rs133801.39 lakhs (approximately 
US$280 million) for the financial year ending in 2009. One key executive was interviewed in 
this company. 
 
The 12 sample respondents, their designations, and the codes used to identify them in the 
paper, are presented in Table 1. 
[Insert TABLE 1 about here] 
 
Source of the publicly available data 
The source of data regarding the strength of the Indian legal system and the regulations and 
rules was the World Bank’s ROSC 2004, Government of India business portal and the BSE 
website. The data regarding concept of the firm, dispersal of equity ownership and role and 
control exerted by banks, are sourced from the ‘Shareholding patterns’ reported in the firms’ 
annual reports. Evidence of the importance of the stock market in India, Australia, USA and 
European economies is sourced as follows: The MCDC data is reported annually by the 
World Federation of Stock Exchanges (in US$ millions) and GDP is reported annually by the 
World Bank (also in US$ millions). This is in line with the usage by other researchers (see 
Weimer & Pape, 1999).  The most recent data available on GDP is for 2007, so the 
comparative figures for MCDC were also taken for 2007. The Indian economy is compared 
with USA, Australia and Europe to highlight the relative importance. However, since a single 
GDP figure is not reported for Europe, selected exchanges and economies in Europe have 
been used. The structure of the board of directors is sourced from the Annual Reports of the 
firms, and, the extent of free float is sourced from the Business Standard publication’s 
website.  
 
 
Findings and Discussion 
 
Oilco Oilco’s annual report addresses only shareholders and the Chairman’s message begins 
‘Shareholders’. In the 2008 financial year, it had a two-tier board with 11 directors, 5 of 
whom were executive directors including the Chairman, 2 were non-executive government 
directors, and 4 were non-executive independent directors (p. 126). The shareholding pattern 
reveals that the Government of India holds 51.11%, foreign institutional investors (FIIs) and 
overseas corporate bodies (OCBs) hold 13.23%, banks hold 0.12%, employees hold 0.12%, 
and others hold 10.49% of the total shares of 338,627,250 (company website).  Thus, bank 
ownership is very low. Oilco’s free float was 48.89% (Business Standard, 2009). 
 
Steelco 1 Steelco 1’s annual report addresses only shareholders and the Chairman’s statement 
begins ‘Dear Shareholders’. In the 2009 financial year, the Board of Directors was two-tiered 
with the Executive Committee and a Joint Executive Committee, alongside a third committee 
specifically for a main division of the company. It was comprised of 14 directors, of which 8 
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were independent. It had a non-Executive Chairman, and the non-executive directors made up 
more than 50% of the total number of directors. The shareholding pattern reveals that 
promoters, including family and group companies, hold 33.95%, foreign institutional 
investors (FIIs) hold 13.20%, banks hold 19.82%, and the general public owns 24% of the 
total shares of 730,592,471 (company website).  Thus, banks are among the three major 
institutional investors along with the FIIs and the Mutual Funds/Unit Trust of India. Steelco 
1’s free float was 66.05% (Business Standard, 2009). 
 
Steelco 2 Steelco 2’s annual report for 2008-09 addresses only the shareholders as the letter 
from the Vice-Chairman and MD starts ‘Dear Shareholders’. In the 2009 financial year, the 
structure of the Board of Directors was single-tiered and was comprised of 15 directors of 
which 11 were non-Executive. Steelco 2 had 8 independent directors and mentions that this 
proportion is more than the stipulated 50% requirement. Apart from the Chairman, the Vice-
Chairman and the MD, no other directors were family members (Annual Report 2009: 39). Its 
shareholding pattern reveals that promoters, including family and group companies, hold 
45.02%, foreign institutional investors (FIIs) hold 29.03%, banks hold 1.51%, employees own 
0.04%, and the public owns 9.07% of the total shares of 187,048,682 (p. 51).  Thus, 
ownership by banks is low. Steelco 2’s free float was 41.25% (Business Standard, 2009). 
 
Aluminiumco Aluminiumco’s Chairman’s report does not address anyone in particular and 
begins by stating the company’s vision. In the 2008 financial year, the Board of Directors was 
single-tiered with Executive and non-Executive members. Of the total of 8 members, 2 were 
executive directors and the remaining 6 were non-executive members. Three were 
independent professional directors. The shareholding pattern reveals that a foreign body 
corporate classified under promoter group holds 80% of the total shares, with 0% of Indian 
promoters, FIIs own 6.14%, banks have 0% ownership, and the total institutional 
shareholding is 6.36%. The non-institutional shareholders comprise bodies corporate, 
individual shareholders (4.5%), OCBs, and non-resident Indians (NRIs), with total shares of 
22,500,000 (company website, p. 54).  Thus, banks have no ownership or role. 
Aluminiumco’s free float was 20% (Business Standard, 2009). 
 
Textilemachineryco Textilemachineryco’s director’s report (p. 42) addresses only 
shareholders as ‘Dear Shareholders’. In the 2008 financial year, the Board of Directors was 
single-tiered with Executive and non-Executive members. Of the total of 8 members, 2 were 
executive directors and the remaining 6 were non-executive members, and included an 
institutional nominee representing the insurance segment. Three were independent 
professional directors. The shareholding pattern for the 2009 financial year reveals that an 
Indian body corporate classified under Indian promoters holds 23.37% of the total shares, 
with 0% foreign promoters, FIIs own 0.31%, banks have 0.02% ownership and insurance 
companies hold 18.18%, with the total institutional shareholding at 22.20%. The non-
institutional shareholders comprise 52% of total shareholders and include bodies corporate 
(15.11%), individual shareholders (19.74%), and OCBs (13.19%), with total shares of 
12,369,250 (company website).  The company’s shares were listed on the Madras Stock 
Exchange also. Textilemachineryco’s free float was 74.19% (Business Standard, 2009). 
 
The individual firms’ data, including the rules and regulations that the firms are required to 
adhere to, and their shareholding pattern including the equity ownership by promoters and 
banks, is classified in Table 2.   
[Insert Table 2 here] 
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Table 2 reveals that the legal system is clearly Anglo-Saxon. Ghosh (2006) observed that the 
Companies Act, 1956, and the series of amendments to it have ensured that the ‘interests of 
shareholders and creditors are protected and that shareholder voice is adequately represented 
in the management of companies’ (p. 3). The board structure and the membership of the 
boards are mixed, reflecting features of both the Anglo-Saxon and Continental systems.  
 
Importance of the stock market Table 3 presents the importance of the stock market for 
various economies.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
The data reveals that India accords a lower importance to the stock market than the Americas 
and Australia. However, Europe accords an even lower importance than India.  
 
Ownership is concentrated in all cases although the role of banks is minimal. Board structures 
are mixed although those that are single-tiered exhibit greater director independence. The 
extent of free float is also mixed although those companies displaying Anglo structures also 
have a tendency to a greater free float. Thus, the Indian governance model is positioned 
midway, implying a hybrid practice. 
 
 
Interview Data 
 
Evidence from traditional governance systems and practices in India 
 
The Prevalence of Trusteeship and Justice  
As [author names removed for refereeing process] (2009) observed, ‘after India’s 
independence in 1947, corporate governance practices in India were modelled on the values 
and philosophy of India’s political leaders, Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, who 
instilled in the public mind the concepts of “trusteeship” and social justice’. The impact is 
clearly seen in the unanimous responses from all five firms.  As CMD observes, ‘… right 
from the beginning when the public sector started, Nehru had a fundamental belief about 
being very, very transparent because, he said, it was public money that was getting invested 
for the public sector, and the management of the public sector is actually the custodian of the 
public money and is answerable to the Parliament of India which it represented. So, over a 
period of time, rules and regulations had evolved in such a way that transparency was in-
built’ [CMD].  
 
CS explains that the founder had instituted the culture of good governance well before the 
formal rules and regulations. ‘Actually the corporate governance concept and corporate 
committees were appointed five or six years back. Even before that we were practising all 
this, although it was not published in our annual reports. The (company) founder was 
responsible for this ethical way of conducting the business. This culture that is in practice 
now in our company has been imbibed at the very beginning itself’ [CS]. MM confirms the 
view of others. ‘But, as a public sector we have always been having our responsibilities 
towards the society at large.  As a government company, that is what we have always been 
doing.  Corporate governance as a law, as a rule has come in later, and yes, we became more 
aware of what corporate governance is. Otherwise … it is an inbuilt thing, which the 
companies have been doing’ [MM].  
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It is worth noting that the large private sector business houses also followed this principle of 
stewardship. ‘Even in the private sector, there were companies like the Tata’s, the Godrej, a 
number of those old Parsi companies … they always had a very transparent way of doing 
business from the start. The Tata’s have always had a reputation for honesty, 
straightforwardness … and even the current Chairman, Ratan Tata, makes it very clear that 
they are not here to make a huge profit. But, at the same time they do make profits [CMD]. 
 
Stakeholder approach to governance  
These firms did not go by the Anglo-Saxon shareholder focus but embraced the stakeholder 
perspective. For instance, Oilco’s vision was broad and holistic and explicitly included 
several stakeholders. As observed by ACS, ‘We derive everything from our vision. Our vision 
says that we will take all steps for value creation, and safety and environment, people, and to 
protect the interest of all the stakeholders’ [ACS]. As MM reminisces, ‘In 1994, that was the 
time we suddenly realised that there is someone called a shareholder and we need to take 
care of his interests as well.  Until then, predominantly we had been looking at the society, 
taking care of the people’ [MM].  
 
Similarly, CS states their traditional approach to governance, ‘Corporate governance as we 
understand is total satisfaction of all the stakeholders - the shareholders, the promoters, the 
suppliers, the customers, the workers, that is, our employees, all these people who are 
connected with and working with the organization. Yes, all these things were in our business 
routines, even before it was made compulsory, or mandated as law. Voluntarily we have been 
in compliance with these requirements’ [CS]. ‘It (the code of conduct) was first handwritten 
and we all followed it. There were no documents. In 1996 we formally documented it’ [VP]. 
And EA goes a step further and includes the public community who may not necessarily be 
employees of the organization, as a major stakeholder. ‘The stakeholders are not just your 
employees or the vendors but also the public who are residing around the factory or 
premises’ [EA].  
 
Evidence of a voluntary approach to principle-centred governance rather than as a 
response to laws and regulations  
 
Evidence of principle-centred governance practices  
They explained the process by which their principles were later formalized and made 
mandatory. Although the legal system is thus quite strong and outwardly exhibiting an Anglo-
Saxon system, clearly the intention of the law is principle-based and the adoption of the law is 
also based on principles, and not a knee-jerk response of control as in the case of say the 
Sarbanes-Oxley. Thus, the law when enacted, is followed in spirit as well as letter. .As ACS 
observed, ‘Right from the early 90’s we had so many practices which were not sort of laid 
down on a legislative level. We had those practices like the 8 hour working day, the maternity 
leave provision, the provident fund, the bonus, all of which subsequently the government 
realized were very important employee welfare activities. That’s how the legislations were 
founded’ [ACS]. As Oilco’s Chairman observes, ‘As a public sector we have always been 
having our responsibilities towards the society at large. As a government company that is 
what we have always been doing. Corporate governance as a law, as a rule, has come in 
later. Yes, we became more aware of what corporate governance is ... Clause 49 (of SEBI) 
lists all the various items … and we found out that, barring one or two items, we were 
actually practising all of them [CMD]. ACS continues, ‘In fact, this (the governance 
regulations) made us proud of ourselves; the many facilities which we are offering to the 
shareholders, we were doing this without thinking about regulations’ [ACS].  
Page  12
 
CSR was integral and spontaneous response based on the principle of ‘giving back to the 
society’.  
All five firms reported that CSR activities were a part of their good governance agenda. This 
approach stemmed from the principle of ‘giving back to the society’ and the interview data 
reveals their continuous and pro-active approach to CSR. For instance, CSL traces the 
traditional approach of the large business houses in India. ‘The Tata Group, who started 100 
years ago ... have built excellent institutes like Tata Institute of Social Sciences ... Even the 
Birla Group was very pioneering and they have set up institutions ... many schools ... many 
institutes, temples, planetariums, and this was all voluntary. There was no law which says 
that you have to spend on corporate social responsibility. Social responsibility of a business 
entity was always in the minds of the old business houses. The notion that we have earned so 
much and we should go and give it back to the society was already there but now I think we 
have a more structured system’ [CSL]. And GMHR adds, ‘One philosophy that our company 
has is that unless the people around you are happy, you cannot grow.  We need to have them 
in with you.  Many of them have flourished’ [GMHR]. AVP sums up the very broad approach 
to this principle. ‘Our management has this outlook, that we introduce something to the 
industry, we introduce something for the society and something to the nation too. That is the 
way we are looking at this.  So it is not that we are collecting the money, so, once we get the 
return it is enough. We (the firm) have to take care of the local people, the community. Of 
course, there is the government. But, government cannot give to everybody. This is the way we 
are looking at it’ [AVP]. 
 
Good governance was voluntarily engaged in due to its positive effects on firm performance 
JMD explains that good governance in their firm includes the aspect of embracing the 
community surrounding their firm, and highlights a crucial interdependency. According to 
him, when the firm supports the surrounding community irrespective of whether they are its 
employees or not, the goodwill in turn provides a protective moat for the firm. ‘This factory 
and its surroundings … we are married to each other. These are the people in whose land this 
factory has come up.  We have to deal with them every day and they have to deal with us. 
Some of them have got benefit out of it; some of them have not got benefit out it.  Those who 
have got benefit by direct employment, or indirect employment, or contracts, or suppliers, are 
fine. But, there are many others who have not got benefit. Our responsibility is towards them 
also. And that responsibility is a requirement. It is not something to talk about. That is the 
basic need to run this organisation; it means having a good relationship with them.  If you 
have good relations with them, nothing will go wrong. Nobody can come here from 15 
kilometres and disturb the factory. Somebody from a town 13 kilometres away can come one 
day with 500 people to disturb us. And if these guys are with the factory, nobody dare come 
here because they know that the surroundings (of the firm) are very powerfully attached to the 
organisation’ [JMD].  
 
CS explains that his firm’s principle of not taking advantage of their superior position has, in 
fact, become a competitive advantage. ‘Ours is a monopoly. Even though we are a monopoly, 
we don’t treat our customers that way. When there is a lot of demand suddenly, we don’t raise 
the prices. Another thing is, in whatever we do, we do not discriminate between customers - 
the small players or the big customers. Whatever the size of the order, we quote the same 
price.  Further, we have a queue (system) for delivery ... we never by-pass the queue. 
Whatever be the case, no favouritism is shown. Although we have our own group companies 
we don’t give preference to any of our group companies. They should also stand in the queue. 
Even the foreign competitors are unable to compete with us because of these principles’ [CS]. 
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As CMD observes, ‘the performance appraisal is very transparent.  The employee can see 
what is written. Because of this the employee grievances have also come down quite a bit’ 
[CMD]. JMD notes the sustainable advantage: ‘if we have good corporate governance the 
company will not go into liquidation overnight’ [JMD]. 
 
Thus, the interview data reveals that Indian firms are embracing the stakeholder-focused 
Continental governance practices and system. The data highlights that the firms have 
traditionally encompassed several stakeholders, included CSR as part of good governance, 
and voluntarily embraced a principle-centred approach. Clearly, this wide stakeholder 
embrace has benefitted the firms by providing them with the stability and security needed for 
sustainable business, and exhibited beneficial flow-on effects to the general public in the 
vicinity of the firm, and the local government, forging a bond between the firm and its 
surroundings. It could be regarded that the firms’ exemplary practices include proactive 
disclosures, community relations and green management that are yet to be mandated by laws, 
a continuous improvement in transparency of their processes and enhanced equity and justice. 
This was supported by a firm-wide code of conduct, principles and regulations, and strict 
enforcement. The economy has had a strong legal system since the 1960’s beginning with the 
Corporations Act, and the government firms and large business houses adhere to them.  
 
Verifying the propositions based on the publicly available data and interview data 
 
In verifying proposition 1, that the Indian governance system adheres more closely to the 
Anglo-Saxon system based on the strength of the legal system, the evolution of India’s legal 
system is pertinent. Prior to liberalization in 1991, the Indian economy had a systematic and 
comprehensive legal, rules-based Anglo-Saxon system. This is confirmed by all five firms 
unanimously. As JMD affirms, ‘The message we get from our management is that we should 
always follow all the rules, regulations, laws and we should always be on the right side of the 
law. So, we have no pressure to do anything wrong, ever’ [JMD]. Post-liberalization, the legal 
system was strengthened further. The World Bank’s (2004: 1) CG ROSC for India noted this 
increased formalization of rules in India:  
Since the first Corporate Governance ROSC assessment dated July 31, 2000, a series 
of legal and regulatory reforms have transformed the Indian corporate governance 
framework and improved the level of responsibility/accountability of insiders, fairness 
in the treatment of minority shareholders and stakeholders, board practices, and 
transparency. These are positive drivers of change. However, enforcement and 
implementation of laws and regulations remain important challenges. 
 
Indeed, De Nicolo et al.’s (2008) Corporate Governance Quality Index for emerging 
economies and developed economies over the period 1994–2003 found that governance 
quality had improved in the Asian countries, while in India the improvements were ‘more 
muted’. The formalization is a necessity, with corporate governance becoming an important 
issue for Chinese and Indian firms as they increasingly interact with regulators and investors 
from developed markets (Li & Nair, 2009). Thus, for the business groups, PSUs and other 
private firms which had been following good governance principles, it seems to be a matter of 
reporting what they had been doing all along. The public became aware of those firms who 
had a long tradition of good governance and had adopted a principle-based governance system 
voluntarily, in contrast to others who merely reacted to the regulations in letter and not in 
spirit.  
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Furthermore, the findings from this study show that the enhanced formalization has had a 
positive benefit for the firms exhibiting good governance. As CMD mentions, ‘That 
(transparency) brings us lots of happiness and at the end of the day it is also a good business 
decision. People are comfortable doing business with us. My company is known for its values 
and transparency.  That’s the reason that we get as partners some of the best companies in 
the world. These are the advantages of transparency. That makes us feel all the more that 
better governance is good business. That is the key [CMD]. Similarly, ACS observes, ‘But to 
distinguish yourself from the others there has to be something that is required, so, if you are 
more transparent, if you are more accountable, you are more open towards the investing 
public and not just making tall claims, but substantiating that with your results or your 
performance, or market capitalization, these are the indicators that people prefer [ACS]. 
 
This positive link between good governance and business performance is similar to 
Afsharipour’s (2009) observation that larger Indian firms welcomed Clause 49’s reforms 
because ‘they appear to have benefited from the more robust corporate governance rules’ 
imposed by the Clause. These large firms witnessed a ‘significant increase in the share price’ 
subsequent to SEBI’s announcement to adopt corporate governance (Black & Khanna, 2007). 
As Fremond and Capaul (2002: 1) put it, succinctly, ‘good corporate governance increases the 
efficiency of capital allocation within and across firms, reduces the cost of capital for issuers, 
helps broaden access to capital, reduces vulnerability to crises, fosters savings provisions, and 
renders corruption more difficult’. 
 
However, enforcement of the Anglo-Saxon oriented rules and regulations is weak. This is 
similar to the situation in 15 countries surveyed by Fremond and Capaul (2002: 2) who 
observed that the ‘courts are under-financed, unmotivated, unclear as to how the law applies, 
unfamiliar with economic issues, or even corrupt. Moreover, securities regulators have little 
direct power to enforce penalties. Enforcement of prevailing rules and regulations is mostly 
the responsibility of the courts. This leads to poor enforcement of the rules and regulations 
underlying corporate governance’. Fremond and Capaul (2002) recommended that ‘in 
countries with weak regulatory environments, concentrated enforcement through the market 
regulators may be preferable to enforcement through the courts’. Data from this study reveals 
that India seems to suffer from this weak enforcement. As observed by ACS, ‘If you legislate 
but you don’t monitor, then that legislation becomes a piece of paper. So it lacks teeth. And 
you know the SEBI is the watchdog. But it lacks teeth. It cannot pursue, it cannot prosecute or 
take any action against the offending companies’ [ACS].  CMD provides further evidence: 
‘But, all these things together do not mean that there was no corruption in the company. 
There is always some petty corruption. And we always say that, and in most cases when I talk 
about corporate governance in any gathering, I say that we say that we cannot escape from 
the society in which we live. Because what is an organisation? It is a microcosm of the society 
that we live in. So whatever ills in society are there, some form or the other will happen there. 
Now, we cannot eliminate that.  But, what I always feel is that, we can mitigate it by putting in 
various interventions’ [CMD]. The World Bank’s CG ROSC (2004) lists strengthening the 
enforcement of rules as an area for policy improvement for India, and identified the reason for 
weakness as follows: ‘The Department of Company Affairs (DCA), SEBI and the stock 
exchanges share jurisdiction over listed companies. This creates a potential for regulatory 
arbitrage and weakens enforcement’ (p. 15). Therefore, in examining Proposition 1, the Indian 
corporate governance system can be classified as mixed – one with a strong legal structure but 
weakly enforced.  
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In examining Proposition 2, that India with its large proportion of family-based firms and high 
promoter holdings means that one would expect Indian corporate governance to adhere more 
closely to the Continental system, the data reveals that all five firms had a strong 
concentration of equity held by promoters, ranging from 80% in Aluminiumco, to 23% in 
Textilemachineryco, thereby revealing a Continental governance system.  
 
In terms of Proposition 3, namely, in Anglo-Saxon systems the importance of the stock 
market is very high, the Indian governance system is neither Anglo-Saxon nor Continental, 
and falls midway along the continuum, revealing the hybridization of its system.    
 
Proposition 4 states that the large firms in India may have fewer or no nominees of the bank 
on the Board with the role of banks low as in Anglo-Saxon systems. Data on the role and 
control by banks reveal the Anglo-Saxon bias of the Indian governance system, with only one 
firm exhibiting close to 20% ownership by banks, and the remaining four firms having 0% to 
2% ownership. Thus, according to Proposition 4, the Indian governance system is Anglo-
Saxon.  
 
According to Proposition 5, namely, the Anglo-Saxon system is more likely to have single-
tier boards with greater number of independent directors, the Indian governance system 
depicts hybridization. The firms exhibit both single and two-tiered boards. The number of 
board members also exhibits the presence of a mixed system. Those firms using a single-tier 
structure, however, do display greater director independence.  
 
Finally, as per Proposition 6, namely, that the Continental systems exhibit low free float, the 
free float factor is very low for all five firms, revealing similarities to the Continental 
governance system.  
 
The study also highlights the way corporate governance systems evolve and change as firms 
engage in proactive or reactive practices. For instance, recently, Zattoni et al. (2009) observed 
that the unaffiliated firms in India started to change their corporate governance systems to 
align with global governance standards, while business group-affiliated firms which were 
bound together by overlapping ties such as cross-ownership, interlocking directorates, inter-
company loans and social relationships continued to depend on their internal product, labour, 
and capital markets and did not feel pressured to comply with the global governance 
standards. This study reveals that there are varying degrees of acceptance and adherence to 
these global standards. Some firms use what are generally regarded as ‘best practice’ Anglo 
governance structures, whilst all display greater ownership concentration than one would find 
in a typical Anglo firm. Others display a more relationship-focused approach with two tier 
boards, and greater executive director involvement.  As ACS stated, ‘I am not saying that it is 
a static situation of the best corporate governance practices. It is always evolving and it is 
evolutionary. There is something new to contribute. And because of the people that we have, 
they bring with them the experience, they can share ... and they are very fascinated by some of 
the best practices that we have.  And that’s only done by improvement - we are already here 
and we just need to scale up to be perfectionists [ACS]. The best practices that ACS refers to 
above, included: 8 hour shifts and bonuses which were made mandatory much later; 
establishing a crèche for children of employees; more recently, establishing a whistleblower 
policy that is not mandatory but is an option in Clause 49; engaging in a new initiative of 
holding AGM’s not only in the headquarters of the firm but also in different cities so as to 
benefit the retail shareholders who cannot travel; and  improvements in investor relations by 
attempting to locate individual shareholders with unclaimed monies with the firm, and 
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sending them their money instead of simply following the rule of sending unclaimed monies 
to the Government. A wider view of stakeholders than what is traditionally seen in Anglo 
firms is evident, along with a community focus and work practices that are ahead of 
community norms.  
 
Concluding remarks 
 
 
What does India’s future corporate governance system look like? As Nestor and Thompson 
(2001: 37) observed, although convergence is occurring in corporate governance due to the 
globalization of financial and product markets, one should not expect uniform corporate 
governance institutions and arrangements throughout the world, because ownership and 
control structures emanate from the particular society’s core characteristics, and, hence, will 
remain idiosyncratic to a considerable degree.  
 
The scope of this study was limited to large listed companies and business groups. It would be 
interesting and informative to expand the study to include a larger and more diverse sample, 
including private and unaffiliated firms. The interview data hints that smaller private firms 
have a different governance system. As the The CMD observes “there is a different type of 
private business who are out there to influence the government and cheat the government; 
absolutely profit-oriented. There is only one-track mind on profit-orientation”. The wider 
sample will thus provide a better view of the governance system. 
 
As pointed out by several researchers (see West, 2009), it is also necessary to understand the 
fundamental sets of values, attitudes, and beliefs that underpin India’s legal and economic 
structures so as to identify the ‘appropriate’ governance structures for India and gauge the 
effectiveness of the hybrid system. Also, as observed by Yoshikawa and Rasheed (2009), a 
comparative study of hybrid practices in different countries is also needed to provide insight 
into whether convergence is inevitable or not.  
 
This paper has revealed India’s home-grown corporate governance system and the extent and 
nature of hybridization within the system. The interview data in particular has explored 
statements around values and established practices thereby highlighting the explicit culture 
and norms of Indian firms. As West (2009) argued, ‘corporate governance models worldwide 
should be mapped according to culture, rather than the legal system, for a more accurate and 
useful picture’ as the evolution of country-specific governance is ‘path dependent’. [Names 
removed for refereeing process] (2009) in tracing the evolution of Indian corporate 
governance and CSR practices observed that the tradition, culture and values had resulted in 
family-owned businesses, government owned firms, professionally owned firms and 
multinationals, all operating alongside one another. This paper in exploring a set of key 
group-affiliated firms highlights the interdependencies of the legal systems, values, culture 
and norms in governance leading to a particular set of governance practices, ownership 
structures and organisational purpose.  
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TABLE 1:  INTERVIEW RESPONDENTS AND CODES USED 
 
Name of the firm Respondent Code used in paper 
Oilco Chairman and Managing Director CMD 
Oilco Executive Assistant to Chairman and MD EA 
Oilco Manager Marketing Research, Planning and Analysis MM 
Steelco 1 Vice-President, Corporate Affairs VP 
Steelco 1 Assistant Company Secretary ACS 
Steelco 1 Financial Controller of a Division FC 
Steelco 2 Joint Managing Director JMD 
Steelco 2 Assistant Vice-President Finance AVP 
Steelco 2 General Manager Human Resources GMHR 
Aluminiumco Company Secretary and Head - Legal CSL 
Aluminiumco Associate CSR Manager CSR 
Textilemachineryco Company Secretary CS 
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TABLE 2:  SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
Variables Anglo-Saxon system Continental system 
Legal system  Strong legal structure 
 but weak enforcement 
 
All 5 companies  
1. The Companies Act, 1956 
2. Companies Bill, 2004 
3. Securities Contracts   
   (Regulation) Act, 1956,  
4. Securities and Exchange   Board 
of India Act, 1992   
5. Depositories Act, 1996  
   [by SEBI] 
 
6. Right to Information Act  
    2005 [relevant for the PSU  
    firm] 
 
Fifteen International regulations 
and Codes published from 1992 - 
2008 
 
Concentration of ownership and 
equity by a single shareholder 
(promoters in all 5 cases) 
 
 
Aluminiumco had the highest 
concentration (Foreign corporate 
bodies: 80%) 
Oilco (Government: 51%) 
Steelco 2 (45%) 
Steelco 1 (34%) 
Textilemachineryco had the lowest 
concentration (23%) 
Importance of the stock market   
India lies between USA and Europe – see Table 3 
Role/control by banks Aluminiumco (0%) 
Textilemachineryco (0.02%) 
Oilco (0.12%) 
Steelco 2 (1.51%) 
 
Steelco 1 (19.82%) 
 
Structure of the Board of 
Directors, and total members in 
the board 
 
Single – Tiered:  
Steelco 2 (15 directors; 4 Exec) 
Aluminiumco (8 directors; 2 Exec ) 
Textilemachineryco (8 directors; 2 
Exec) 
Two-Tiered: 
Oilco (11 directors; 5 Exec) 
Steelco 1 (14 directors; 6 Exec) 
Extent of free float (%) Anglo- Saxon systems have free 
float of > 55% 
Steelco 1 (66.05%) 
Textilemachineryco (74.19%) 
 
Continental systems have free float 
of < 55% 
Aluminiumco (20%) 
Steelco 2 (41.25%) 
Oilco (48.89%) 
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TABLE 3:  IMPORTANCE OF THE STOCK MARKET IN AUSTRALIA, INDIA, EUROPE AND USA   
 
 
 
Stock Exchange 
MCDC (USD 
millions)  End 
2007 
 
 
 
Economy 
GDP (USD 
millions)  
End 2007 
MCDC as a 
percentage of 
GDP 
End 2007 
 
Rank in 
terms of 
importance 
Swiss Exchange 1,271,047.7 Switzerland 424,367 300% 1 
Americas - total 
region 
24,320,319.8 USA 13,751,400 177% 2 
Australian Stock 
Exchange 
1,298,315.0 Australia 820,974 158% 3 
Bombay Stock 
Exchange 
1,819,100.5 India 1,176,890 155% 4 
London SE 3,851,705.9 UK 2,772,024 139% 5 
BME Spanish 
Exchanges 
1,799,834.0 Spain 1,436,891 125% 6 
 
